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This paper examines the links between gambling, moral regulation, and 
politics in Canada. The proliferation of online gaming platforms has 
resulted in a new wave of gaming expansion, with online casinos and 
sports betting growing in market share over traditional land-based 
betting. Does Canada’s Criminal Code and supporting regulatory 
scheme effectively address the problems posed by online gambling? 
This paper examines the origins and history of the gambling provisions 
in the Criminal Code and reviews their development over time through 
amendments and judicial interpretation. The paper then establishes 
how the Criminal Code provisions are applied to bets made over the 
internet. Next, it analyzes the legal issues around the Kahnawake 
Gaming Commission, an extension of a First Nation’s claim to 
sovereignty and the most prolific online gambling regulator in the 
world. The paper concludes with ideas about the next steps in gaming 
regulation in Canada, suggesting the federal government is better 
suited than the provinces to provide and regulate gaming done over 
the internet.  
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Benjamin Disraeli’s fictional character Lord Roehampton had a saying that 
“there is no gambling like politics.”1 Lord Roehampton’s curious idiom touches 
on an intimate connection between government and vice. In Canada, that 
connection remains stronger than ever. Gambling is part of everyday life and at 
its core, is innocent enough – two people disagree about the likely outcome of a 
future event, each of whom will profit if the other is wrong. In the episode 
“Hurricane Neddy”, The Simpsons character Ned Flanders famously said that 
insurance was like gambling: in a nutshell, the insured bets that their car will break 
down and require repairs before they’ve paid that value in premiums. In addition 
to this tongue-in-cheek and innocent association, gambling is also associated with 
alcohol, drugs, and prostitution as a related ‘vice’. At best, gambling is tolerated 
as a necessary evil, but many societies take steps to restrict or ban gambling 
altogether. In Canada, the Criminal Code has had anti-gambling prohibitions since 
it first came into force in 1892, but gambling is now regarded as inevitable, and 
as a regulatory rather than criminal problem. 
Despite restrictions on gambling in Canada and around the world, global 
gambling revenue is expected to surpass $600 billion USD by 2022.2 Online 
gaming accounts for a significant portion of that growing pie. In 2014, the market 
for online gaming was estimated at $35.97 billion USD and is expected to climb 
to $66.59 billion USD by 2020.3 The Criminal Code provisions on gambling haven’t 
changed since 1985 but are expected to respond to a phenomenon that didn’t 
                                                                                                                                         
1 Benjamin Disraeli, Endymion, (Project Gutenberg, 2006), Chapter LXXXII, online: 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7926/7926-h/7926-h.htm>. 
2 Brian Pempus, “Global Gambling Market To Reach $635 Billion By 2022, New Research Says” (27 
September 2016), online: <http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-news/20865-global-gambling-market-to-
reach-635-billion-by-2022>. 















even exist in the 1980s. The current gambling provisions do not sufficiently 
address the harms of online gambling; they are not tailored to the new and 
emerging problems that are caused by instant communication across the internet. 
This paper examines the origins and history of the gambling provisions in the 
Criminal Code4, and reviews their development over time and through case law. 
Next, the paper establishes how the Criminal Code applies to bets made over the 
internet. It analyzes the legal issues around the Kahnawake Gaming Commission, 
an extension of a First Nation’s claim to sovereignty and the most prolific online 
gambling regulator in the world. The paper concludes with ideas about the next 
steps in gaming regulation in Canada, suggesting the federal government regain 
control over online gaming. 
Though the biggest new development in gambling law is the availability of 
online gaming, it is important to establish the framework under which the Criminal 
Code deals with gambling at large. Unlike the United States, who have the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act,5 Canada does not use a separate legal framework 
for addressing internet gambling specifically.6 The Criminal Code sorts gambling 
provisions into the section on ‘Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting’, making 
clearer the original moral aspects of gambling laws.7 Section 201 of the Criminal 
Code prohibits common gaming houses and common betting houses, as locations 
where for-profit gambling occurs.8 Section 202 prohibits a number of activities 
related to for-profit gambling, including pool-selling, registering or recording 
bets, publishing odds or other betting information, or keeping any device used 
for gambling or betting.9 None of these prohibitions apply to bets between 
private individuals who are “not engaged in any way in the business of betting”, 
                                                                                                                                         
4 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]. 
5 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 USC §§ 5361-5366 (2006). 
6 Jamie Strashin, “Online sports betting ignored by Canadian government while US acts”, CBC Sports (4 May 
2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/sports/sports-gambling-canada-united-states-regulation-1.3565832>.  
7 Criminal Code, supra note 4 at Part VII, ss 197–213. 
8 Ibid, s 201.  
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prohibiting for-profit betting only.10 Section 204 contains other important 
exemptions that apply to horse racing, delegating significant regulatory powers to 
the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food in controlling gambling on horse 
races.11  
A strange element to this framework is the separation between the ‘lottery 
schemes’ in section 206, and the prohibitions in section 202, which are aimed 
primarily at bookkeeping and sports betting. Section 206 prohibits a diverse range 
of gambling behaviour, all of which is labelled a ‘lottery scheme’. The broad scope 
of these provisions is demonstrated by the length and complexity of some of 
these provisions. For example, section 206(1)(e) prohibits any “scheme, 
contrivance or operation” where players stake current or future payment of 
money or other valuable security in exchange for the chance to win a greater sum, 
because other players have contributed (or will contribute) money or valuable 
security.12 The nature of a wager or bet is difficult to identify, and the incredibly 
broad language in section 206 is a testament to that challenge. Section 207 allows 
lotteries operated or licensed by provincial governments, keeping in mind that 
the definition of ‘lottery’ includes almost everything prohibited by sections 
206(1)(a) through 206(1)(g), and therefore allows the provinces to conduct and 
manage almost any gaming operation, or authorize another body to do so.13 One 
of the few differences with online and electronic gaming is that provinces cannot 
license other organizations to conduct or manage lotteries conducted “on or 
through a computer, video device or slot machine”; these types of games must 
be operated by the province directly.14 
Compared to other jurisdictions, Canada’s criminal framework for gambling 
is relatively permissive. Betting is allowed so long as the players are the only ones 
                                                                                                                                         
10 Ibid, s 204(1)(b). 
11 Ibid, ss 204(1)(c), 204(5–11). 
12 Ibid, s 206(1)(e). 
13 Ibid, ss 206(1)(a)–206(1)(g). 













who win and lose, and the Criminal Code even makes specific exceptions to allow 
for horse racing and provincial lotteries.15 Canadian criminal law was not always 
so tolerant of gambling. With the codification of Canadian criminal law in 1892, 
the Criminal Code adopted already-existing legislative bans on gambling.16 Horse-
race betting was the first licensed and regulated form of gambling in Canada, with 
a criminal code exemption in place since 1910. This exemption was suspended 
for a brief period between 1917 and 1920 because gambling was considered 
wasteful and “incommensurate with the war effort.”17 Horse races are regulated 
by the federal Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, who licenses racetrack 
operators to run races and collect bets.18 The gambling around horse tracks 
supports the husbandry and racing industries – racing and betting have always 
gone together. Critics of this early gaming exemption ran up against stiff 
opposition from courts and governments who saw gambling as a necessary evil 
to support “a pastime and business of much importance”.19 As Chief Justice 
Meredith of the Ontario Court of Appeal so succinctly put it, “no betting no 
racing; a killing of two birds with one stone.”20 For several decades, horse racing 
was the only legal betting allowed by the Criminal Code, but more ‘business of 
much importance’ was soon to follow.  
Legalized lotteries are a much more recent development, occurring in the 
late 20th century. Their introduction came with the same Criminal Code reforms 
that legalized abortion and same-sex sexual activity, diminishing the influence of 
moral regulation on criminal law.21 From 1969 onwards, the federal government 
used lotteries primarily for financing large national events such as the Olympics 
in Montreal (1976) and Calgary (1988).22 The provinces resented federal 
involvement in the lottery business, and lobbied for exclusive control of gaming 
                                                                                                                                         
15 Ibid, ss 204(1)(c), 207. 
16 Colin S Campbell, Timothy F Hartnagel & Garry J Smith, The Legalization of Gambling in Canada (July 2005) at 
13, online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/lcc-cdc/JL2-64-2005E.pdf>. 
17 Ibid at 14 (Table 1). 
18 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 204(1)(c)(i). 
19 Re Racetracks and Betting (1921), 36 CCC 357 at para 5, 61 DLR 504. 
20 Ibid at para 2. 
21 Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 14. 
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and the revenues that it brought to governments.23 In 1985, the federal 
government agreed to amend the Criminal Code to allow only the provincial 
governments to conduct and manage lotteries. This concession was made in 
exchange for a cash payment of $100 million towards the Calgary Olympics, and 
annual payments of $24 million (indexed to inflation) from provincial lottery 
revenues.24 Gambling had now become a significant revenue generator for both 
federal and provincial governments. The lottery deal was netting the federal 
government $60 million annually by 2003.25 Critics and cynics pointed out the 
“dubious morality of elected representatives decriminalizing otherwise criminal 
behaviour for cash payments.”26 They saw the federal government abandoning 
the morality-based approach to gambling regulation, appearing to replace it with 
nothing but bare pragmatism.  
These criticisms were compounded by the fact that the deal was approved 
by Parliament with minimal public consultation, and a debate that lasted less than 
3 hours. From second reading on November 6, 1985 to royal assent on December 
20 of the same year, no amendments were made, and many felt that it had been 
“rubber-stamped” by Parliament.27 Debates around the bill were led not by the 
Minister of Justice and Justice critics, but by Ministers and critics for fitness and 
sport.28 The Progressive-Conservative government heralded the bill as a way to 
lock in provincial support for the Olympics (in the form of an immediate $100 
million payment). The Honourable Otto Jelinek said that Bill C-81 “gives a clear 
legislative recognition to past and present provincial activities” and “sets some 
realistic and clear standards on what is permissible.” The key for the government 
was the elimination of an irritant in federal-provincial relations, and defining the 
scope of what gaming activities the provinces could undertake.29 The Opposition 
                                                                                                                                         
23 Ibid at 16-17. 
24 Ibid at 17. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Timothy IW Patrick, “No Dice: Violations of the Criminal Code’s Gaming Exemptions by Provincial 
Governments” (2000) 44:1 Crim LQ 108 at 11. 
27 Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 17–18. 
28 “Bill C-81, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (lotteries)”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 33rd 
Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 6 (6 November 1985) at 8416-8417 (Hon Otto Jelinek) [“Bill C-81”]. 













criticized the Bill for removing funding for Canada’s national sports teams (which 
were previously funded by federal sports pools and lotteries).30 The NDP critic 
was adamant that gambling should not be supported or condoned by the 
government, because of the “social and moral consequences” that go along with 
it. Mr. Epps called Bill C-81 “a Bill that is only to be supported because of its 
half-way nature”, and called on the government to eventually remove the 
government-operated lottery exemptions from the Criminal Code.31 The NDP 
critic seemed to be the only one who maintained a moral opposition to gambling, 
whereas the members of the government and official opposition were much more 
concerned about improving the relationship with the provinces and using 
gambling revenues to fund other federal activities. 
Despite Minister Jelinek’s assurance that Bill C-81 would “not promote an 
expansion of gambling”, the 1985 amendments led to a significant growth in both 
lottery ticket sales and casino gambling. By 2003, government-operated lotteries, 
bingo, electronic gaming machines (EGMs or, more commonly “video lottery 
terminals” – VLTs), and casinos brought in $12 billion of revenue across 
Canada.32 By clarifying the boundaries of acceptable conduct for the provinces, 
Bill C-81 facilitated this expansion. In addition, the Criminal Code continued to 
prohibit any for-profit gambling conducted by non-provincial entities. This 
political deal gave the provinces a monopoly on gaming, supported by criminal 
sanctions. In a paper presented to the Law Commission of Canada, Campbell, 
Hartnagel & Smith conclude that “Canadian criminal law has been used to 
consolidate provincial authority over gambling as a revenue raising instrument 
and to expand its availability rather than restrict it in any meaningful sense.”33 
Patrick agrees, calling the creation of a provincial monopoly “a peculiar use of 
the criminal law power.”34 This peculiar use remains the status quo to this day, as 
the provinces continue to be the only authorized managers and conductors of 
lottery and gaming operations in Canada. 
                                                                                                                                         
30 Ibid at 8417-8418 (Hon Sergio Marchi). 
31 Ibid at 8420 (Hon Ernie Epps). 
32 Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 20. 
33 Ibid at 7-8. 
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This delegation of gambling regulation to the provinces has been challenged 
unsuccessfully in the courts. In R v Furtney,35 the accused were managers of a 
charity lottery who were alleged to have breached conditions of their provincial 
license, and therefore liable under the Criminal Code section 207(3).36 They argued 
that the parts of section 207, under which they were charged, were an improper 
delegation of the federal criminal power to the provinces, and that the law was 
therefore ultra vires. The Supreme Court agreed that delegation of authority from 
one level of government to another is “constitutionally impermissible”37, but the 
court found that the delegation in section 207 was not improper. The court held 
that section 207 delegated authority to the provincial Lieutenant Governor in 
Council, separate from the provincial legislature.38 In addition, section 207 allows 
provincial legislation to dictate its scope by referring to provincial laws relating to 
the terms and conditions of lottery licenses.39 The Supreme Court held that 
gambling could be regulated jointly by the federal and provincial governments, 
acting under different heads of power.  
The accused in R v Hair40 made similar constitutional arguments that the 
criminal elements of gambling had disappeared from the law. They argued – with 
evidence from Dr. Garry Smith – that the criminal law was intended to give effect 
to the political deal with the provinces and was no longer directed at the 
prevention of gambling. If the Criminal Code was not concerned with the moral 
and social consequences of gambling, intending instead to protect a provincial 
monopoly on gambling, it could be argued that it now lacked a valid criminal law 
purpose for legislating on the subject. The applicants in Hair made the argument 
that the 1985 amendments demonstrated not only a public shift in morals, but a 
shift in Parliament’s intention as well.41 Hair is the most recent case to address 
                                                                                                                                         
35 R v Furtney, [1991] 3 SCR 89, 129 NR 241, 14 WCB (2d) 35 [Furtney]. 
36 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 207(3). 
37 Furtney, supra note 35 at para 33. 
38 Ibid at para 34. 
39 Ibid at para 35. 
40 R v Hair, 2016 ONSC 900, 349 CRR (2d) 256 [Hair]. 













the constitutionality of the gambling provisions.42 Relying on Furtney and other 
appellate-level decisions43, the court held that the criminal provisions relating to 
gambling are still valid exercises of federal power. Justice Brown of the Ontario 
Superior Court held that there were still significant harms related to unlicensed 
gambling and that there had not been a material change in the circumstances or 
evidence that would allow the court to revisit this issue already addressed by 
appellate courts.44 Justice Brown declined to distinguish the case from Furtney45, 
and maintained that the criminal law still validly applied to gambling.  
The court in Hair had to address another new development in gambling law 
which had arisen since Furtney. In 2001, Parliament passed legislation to stiffen 
penalties for organized criminal activity. Bill C-2446 redefined criminal 
organizations as any group of three or more people, who have as one of their 
main purposes or main activities the commission of one or more serious offences 
which will result in a material benefit for the group. The definition of a serious 
offence was amended to include any offence with a maximum sentence of five 
years or greater, plus any other offences prescribed by regulation.47 In 2010, 
Regulation SOR/2010-161 made the crimes in sections 202 and 206 “serious 
offences”, opening up bettors and gambling providers to prosecution for 
organized crime offences.48 The accused in Hair49 argued that this additional 
jeopardy for conduct which was not morally or socially harmful violated their 
section 7 Charter rights.50 Justice Brown found that Parliament did not only intend 
to target “major players in traditional criminal organizations”51, and that the 
                                                                                                                                         
42 Ibid.  
43 R v Andriopoulos, 1994 CanLII 147 (ONCA), 1994 CarswellOnt 3947; R v Jourdain (2001), 150 OAC 
314 (CA), 51 WCB (2d) 283; Siemens v Manitoba, 2003 SCC 3, [2003] 1 SCR 6.  
44 Hair, supra note 40 at para 48. 
45 Furtney, supra note 35. 
46 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law enforcement) and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001 (assented to 18 December 2001), SC 2001, c 32. 
47 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 467.1(1). 
48 Regulations Prescribing Certain Offences to be Serious Offences, SOR/2010-161, s 1 [Regulations]. 
49 Hair, supra note 40. 
50 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
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inclusion of gambling offences as serious offences captures exactly the kind of 
harmful conduct that Parliament intended to be covered by the gambling laws.  
While Justice Brown’s decisions on these two issues – the scope of the 
criminal law power, and whether tying gambling to organized crime breaches 
section 7 of the Charter52 – seem consistent with one another, they do still raise 
the question: If for-profit gambling is so harmful to society, why does Parliament 
allow provinces to conduct and license gambling operations at all? One major 
reason is that publicly-operated lotteries and gaming fund the public purse rather 
than organized crime. The evidence supports the connection that Justice Brown 
saw between unlicensed gambling and criminal organizations. Detective 
Inspector Moodie, as head of Ontario’s Illegal Gaming Enforcement Unit, found 
that illegal gambling was a major funding source for traditional organized crime, 
and that despite the criminal prohibitions, there were “no significant deterrents” 
for criminal organizations to operate illegal gambling rings.53 He called gambling 
revenues the “foundation upon which most other illicit activities are 
supported.”54 Clearly, a policy change was necessary to ensure that criminal 
organizations could not profit off of gambling. 
Writing as he was before the coming into force of Regulation SOR/2010-
16155, Detective Inspector Moodie likely would have approved of the additional 
deterrents to gambling offences flowing from their inclusion in section 467.56 
However, the availability of legal gambling is not enough by itself to prevent 
criminal organizations from running gaming rings for profit. In a study of illegal 
gambling in Western Canada, the most common forms of illegal gaming were 
found to be “ironically, … versions of government-offered gambling formats” 
such as unlicensed VLTs, offshore lotteries, and underground card rooms.57 The 
authors of the study noted that “illegal gambling formats compete well with their 
                                                                                                                                         
52 Charter, supra note 50. 
53 LD Moodie, Ontario’s organized crime section—Illegal gambling unit: Its evolution and accomplishments (Paper 
presented at the Gambling, Law Enforcement and Justice System Issues conference, University of Alberta, 
Edmonton, AB, March 2002) at 7. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Regulations, supra note 48. 
56 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 467. 













legal counterparts because they offer more attractive wagering propositions and 
services such as credit, better odds, higher stakes, and telephone betting.”58 This 
is perhaps the most persuasive reason to maintain criminal prohibitions on 
gambling activity. Provinces certainly need to restrict gambling to some extent to 
avoid the potential social harms of excess gambling, but overly bureaucratic or 
restrictive regulatory frameworks allow organized crime to thrive despite the 
existence of legal alternatives. Criminal sanctions may still be necessary to deter 
and dismantle criminal organizations who engage in illegal gambling to fund 
themselves. Seen in this light, the criminal law does indeed help support the 
provincial monopoly over gambling, but it does so at the expense of criminal 
enterprise.  
If the dismantling of organized crime favours a less restrictive regulatory 
framework, the pressure in the other direction is the need to prevent problem 
gambling and other related social ills. Provinces may be ‘competing’ with criminal 
organizations for revenue, but they are still obligated to prevent harms to their 
residents. Coming back to the criticisms raised by Mr. Epps in debates around 
Bill C-8159, provinces are effectively condoning gambling behaviour while 
benefiting from the revenues. Nova Scotia’s Addictions Services Office notes that 
“the very significant revenue derived from gambling activity sets up the potential 
for a conflict of interest for governments who must also address the associated 
health and social problems.”60 On average, Canadian provinces rely on gambling 
income for 3.8% of their own-source revenue.61 In response to this dilemma, 
provinces have set up an array of prevention and harm reduction programs for 
gambling. Most of these programs have been focused at reducing demand for 
gambling. Demand-side efforts are less threatening to the ‘gambling industry’ of 
licensees and gaming facilities, and so are politically easy to put in place. Unlike 
supply-side restrictions which would directly limit the ability to offer gambling 
                                                                                                                                         
58 Ibid. 
59 “Bill C-81”, supra note 28. 
60 Nova Scotia Department of Health Promotion and Protection, Best Advice for Preventing Problem Gambling in 
Nova Scotia, by Gary Roberts and Associates (November 2008), online: 
<https://novascotia.ca/dhw/addictions/documents/Best-Advice-for-Preventing-Gambling-Problems-in-
Nova-Scotia.pdf> at 26 [Best Advice]. 
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services in and of themselves, demand-based reduction approaches only hurt 
revenues if they are effective. Private industry is also benefitting from the 
expansion of gambling. VLT operators in Alberta retain 15% of the profits from 
each machine, giving the gambling industry a substantial incentive to promote 
risky gambling behaviour. The rationale of keeping gambling revenue public “may 
be compromised since sizable portions” of the profits that accrue from gaming 
are directed to private operators.62 In regulating and restricting gambling, 
provinces must not only fight through their own conflict of interest but also the 
private incentives to expand gambling revenues. 
Though favoured by the gambling industry, demand reduction measures are 
less effective at reducing problem gambling than programs aimed at restricting 
the availability of gaming or reducing the harms caused by gambling.63 VLTs are 
particularly prone to problem gambling, because of the increased pace of play and 
the addition of visual and auditory stimuli.64 64% of problem gamblers in Nova 
Scotia listed VLTs as the top concern for their gambling behaviour.65 Provinces 
have been hesitant to restrict the number of operating VLTs because they have 
been a significant revenue generator. Though online gambling may be less 
addictive than VLTs, its accessibility and convenience requires careful attention 
to prevent problem gambling.66 The easy availability of electronic gambling is a 
serious problem for provinces to regulate, and the current state of the criminal 
law means the federal government is removed from that regulatory picture. These 
moral and social problems are rightly addressed by the criminal law.  
Online and electronic gaming have reached their maturity in Canada. The 
first online casino opened its virtual doors in 1995. By 2001, there were 250 
                                                                                                                                         
62 Campbell, Hartnagel & Smith, supra note 16 at 58. 
63 Best Advice, supra note 60 at 28. 
64 Andrew Nikiforuk, “Alberta’s Gamble with Gambling”, The Walrus (12 November 2006), online: 
<https://thewalrus.ca/2006-11-society/>. 
65 Best Advice, supra note 60 at 6. 
66 Kahlil S Philander & Terri-Lynn MacKay, “Online gambling participation and problem gambling severity: is 













websites offering gambling online. By 2009, that number had jumped to 2500 
sites, operating from 50 different jurisdictions.67 International accounting firm 
PwC concludes that while it is clear that the market is gradually “going digital”, 
“the pace and scale of the migration to online spending is clearly much more 
difficult to call”68 simply because regulation of the market is so fragmented, and 
it is difficult to get accurate assessments of underground gambling. Players may 
prefer online gaming to land-based casino or VLT gaming for several reasons. 
The most common reasons relate to accessibility, convenience, and a preference 
for gaming in private rather than in public.69 The development of new online 
technologies and the growing ease of financial transactions over the internet 
suggest that online gaming will continue to expand in popularity. Surprisingly, 
Canadian law has done little to respond to this trend. 
A private members’ bill in the late ‘90s attempted to bring the Criminal Code 
up to date with respect to online gaming. Bill C-353 (An Act to amend the Criminal 
Code (Internet Lotteries)) was introduced in November of 1996 and passed second 
reading in February of 1997.70 During the debate, members touted the strong 
economic benefits that regulated online gaming could have for Canada. One 
member, though opposed to gaming in principle, stated that “Canadians are 
already gambling on the Internet and money is leaving the country.”71 The bill 
proposed that the federal government jump back into the field to regulate online 
gaming. The Bill’s main feature was an amendment to section 207 of the Criminal 
Code, which would have expanded the ability of governments (at both the 
provincial and federal level) to regulate and operate online gaming services. In 
addition to schemes conducted or managed by the provinces, the federal 
government would have been able to “conduct and manage a lottery scheme on 
the Internet”, “either alone or in conjunction with the government of one or 
                                                                                                                                         
67 Nova Scotia, Responsible Gaming Strategy 2011, (strategic report), at 6. 
68 PwC, Gaming Outlook 2011-2012 at 38.  
69 Robert T Wood, Robert J Williams & Paul K Lawton, “Why do Internet gamblers prefer online versus land-
based venues? Some preliminary findings and implications” (2007) 20 Journal of Gambling Issues 235 at 239. 
70 Bill C-353, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Internet lotteries), 2nd Sess, 35th Parl, 1997 [Bill C-353]. 
71 “Bill C-353, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Internet lotteries)”, House of Commons Debates, 35th Parl, 2nd 
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more provinces”.72 The sponsor of the bill, the Honourable Dennis Mills, 
addressed the issue of the 1985 lottery deal, and its inability to respond to the 
internet age: “When the whole use of the Internet is exploding in front of our 
very faces, there was never ever any discussion back in 1979 or 1985 whether or 
not this was going to be a serious issue.”73 Mr. Mills urged the federal government 
to be proactive in regulating online gaming, rather than waiting for the provinces 
to act on their own. The Parliamentary Secretary for International Trade opined 
that it was high time for the federal government to debate and decide “whether 
it wants to be in the business [of online gambling] and if it is in the business how 
it relates to the provincial governments and the previous agreements on lotteries 
that were made a few years ago.”74 Despite these efforts to modernize Canada’s 
gaming legislation, the bill died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved 
in April of 1997, and online gaming continued to be prohibited except where 
conducted and managed by the provinces under section 207. 
As we’ve already seen, the Criminal Code provisions on gambling prevent 
Canadian companies from operating online gaming services.75 The Starnet case is 
one of the only prosecutions in Canada that applies these prohibitions to online 
gambling.76 Starnet Communications Inc. was a company headquartered in 
Delaware, which operated pornographic websites and online casinos. This latter 
business attracted the attention of Canadian organized crime investigators. 
Starnet kept servers in Vancouver through which gamblers would download 
software for playing online games. This software would route the gambler’s 
connection through the Vancouver servers to other systems in Antigua.77 In 2001, 
Starnet was charged under section 202(1)(b) of the Criminal Code78 for keeping a 
device used for gambling – the device being the computers and computer 
networks located at their Vancouver offices. Starnet pleaded guilty, receiving a 
                                                                                                                                         
72 Bill C-353, supra note 70, s 1. 
73 Bill C-353 Debates, supra note 71 at 8112 (Hon Dennis J Mills). 
74 Ibid at 8116 (Hon Ron MacDonald). 
75 Re Earth Future Lottery, 2002 PESCAD 8, aff’d 2003 SCC 10, 215 DLR (4th) 656 [Earth Future]. This case is 
discussed further at pp 2-3 and 17. 
76 R v Starnet Communications International Inc, 2001 CarswellBC 3525 (BC Prov Court) [Starnet]. 
77 Ibid at para 15. 













fine of $100,000, and forfeiting $3.925 million US in profits.79 For this charge, it 
was irrelevant that only a small portion of the gamblers who accessed Starnet’s 
gaming services were Canadians – though it warranted mention by Starnet’s 
defense attorney, who likely wanted to diminish the impact that Starnet’s activities 
might have had in Canada. What’s clear though is that the elements of section 
202(1)(b)80 would have been met even without participation by Canadian 
gamblers. The keeping of the device is the crime, regardless of the location from 
which bets are placed.  
Territoriality poses an interesting problem for online gaming, as for other 
offences committed over the internet. Would Starnet still have been prosecuted 
in Canada had their servers been located offshore? Most online gaming would 
violate section 206(1)(e), which is broad enough to cover any situation where a 
player stakes money in exchange for the chance to be owed a greater sum of 
money.81 Online casinos may fall afoul of section 202(1)(d), which prohibits 
recording or registering bets.82 Even if the server is located outside of Canada, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal (upheld by the Supreme Court) has held that bets 
are agreements between two people, requiring both offer and acceptance, each of 
which may occur in a different location.83 Certainly foreign operators pose 
problems for enforcement, particularly where the companies have no assets or 
physical presence in Canada. Courts will likely not entertain a criminal charge 
against a person not present in Canada. However, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in SOCAN opens the door to prosecution based solely on the reception of an 
internet transmission in Canada.84 The question remains unanswered, but 
prosecution is certainly possible. Canadians and Canadian companies could be 
subject to several charges for facilitating this criminal activity. These foreign 
gambling operators could easily fall into the definition of a criminal organization 
in section 467.1(1), which specifically includes persons inside or outside of 
                                                                                                                                         
79 Starnet, supra note 76 at para 40. 
80 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 202(1)(b). 
81 Ibid, s 206(1)(e). 
82 Ibid, s 202(1)(d). 
83 R v Benwell, [1973] 10 CCC (2d) 503n, aff’g [1972] 3 OR 906. 
84 Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at 
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Canada committing serious offences.85 Recalling that SOR/2010-161 made 
section 202 a serious offense, facilitating or receiving a gaming transaction could 
result in criminal liability. Financial institutions and server hosts are among those 
most at risk of being hit with these charges.86 Companies that host gaming servers 
are critical to the transmission of data itself, while financial institutions could be 
violating section 202(1)(c), which prohibits holding money or property relating to 
any transaction prohibited by section 202.87 Though no Canadian company has 
ever been charged for facilitating online gaming, the provisions could easily and 
reasonably be interpreted to include foreign operators offering bets to Canadians. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Earth Future supports the interpretation that 
a lottery may take place in more than one place at once using telecommunications, 
opening the operator to criminal liability.88 The court was asked to determine the 
validity of a license granted to a charity lottery that proposed selling lottery tickets 
by telephone and over the internet on a global scale. The Supreme Court upheld 
the decision of the PEI Supreme Court Appeal Division that the lottery license 
was invalid and in breach of the Criminal Code. The Attorney General of Prince 
Edward Island argued that since the servers and infrastructure were all located on 
the island, the lottery was conducted and managed there. In addition, the rules 
and regulations of the lottery included a provision that deemed any transactions 
to have taken place in PEI. The court drew a distinction between a lottery 
conducted from a province and lotteries conducted in the province.89 They also 
found that the deeming provision – while it may be determinative for private 
contract disputes – had no effect on changing the location of the actus reus of a 
criminal offence.90 By attempting to conduct the lottery partially outside the 
province, the Earth Fund would have contravened the offence in section 207(3) 
of conducting a lottery scheme outside of the scope of provincial authorization.91  
                                                                                                                                         
85 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 467.1(1). 
86 John Tuzyk, “Internet Gaming in Canada” (2006) 10:5 J Internet L 3 at 7. 
87 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 202(1)(c). 
88 Earth Future, supra note 75. 
89 Ibid at para 15. 
90 Ibid at para 19. 













The Court added that even if it had found that the lottery was conducted 
entirely in PEI, the types of scheme that provinces can license are restricted by 
section 207(4)(c).92 Provinces cannot license other bodies to conduct and manage 
lotteries “operated on or through a computer”.93 This means that online gaming 
and online lottery sales are the exclusive domain of the provinces. Charitable 
lotteries and casinos cannot offer digital or online gaming without breaching 
section 207(3).94 Section 207(4)(c)95 permits only lotteries that comply with 
section 207(1)(a) (schemes conducted and managed by the province, or by several 
provinces, only operating in those provinces).96 
Interprovincial agreements for online lotteries are still possible but are made 
more difficult because they cannot license another body to manage the lottery 
(the process allowed by section 207(1)(f) of the Criminal Code).97 The Western 
Canada Lottery Corporation (WCLC) and Atlantic Lottery Corporation (ALC) 
are creatures of interprovincial agreement and are owned by their constituting 
governments98. These crown corporations are part of government and meet the 
requirements of section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,99 at least according to the 
provinces that make them up.100 Their validity has not been challenged in court. 
The Interprovincial Lottery Corporation (ILC), on the other hand, is owned by 
each of the provincial and interprovincial lottery corporations (BC Lottery 
                                                                                                                                         
92 Ibid, s 207(4)(c); Earth Future, supra note 75 at paras 14-15. 
93 Criminal Code, supra note 4 s 207(4)(c). 
94 Ibid, s 207(3). 
95 Ibid, 207(4)(c). 
96 Ibid, s 207(1)(a). 
97 Ibid, s 207(1)(f). 
98 The WCLC is owned by Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (with the territories as associate members), 
and the ALC is owned by New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and PEI. 
99 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 207(1)(a). 
100 See e.g. the Nova Scotia government’s claim of legitimacy: “Gaming”, online: Access Nova Scotia 
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Corporation, WCLC, Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, Loto-Québec, 
and ALC). Lotteries operated by the ILC are marketed and sold online as well as 
in brick-and-mortar stores.101 Revenue from ILC lotteries is returned to the 
member organizations in proportion to ticket sales in those regions.    
After Earth Future,102 PEI made another attempt to create a lottery that 
would have extra-provincial reach. The government of PEI was concerned that 
unregulated online gambling was undermining their gaming revenues, but the 
government couldn’t compete by offering their own e-gaming platform. PEI is 
too small to make online gaming viable in that province alone, so the province 
went looking for other opportunities to reach a larger market.103 In 2008, the 
provincial government pursued two options for making PEI an online gaming 
hub: Plan A was an interprovincial agreement that would provide other provinces 
a share of the revenue from the gaming site in exchange for access to their 
markets, and Plan B was to host the servers for the gaming platform on the 
Abegweit First Nation reserve, to make prosecution under the Criminal Code less 
likely. The province loaned $950,000 to the Mi’kmaq Confederacy of PEI 
(MCPEI) to research Plan B and began work to bring other provinces aboard.104 
To operate the gaming hub, the province linked up with Capital Markets 
Technologies (CMT), a tech company with access to a platform for secure and 
rapid financial transactions. CMT’s expertise and its ability to create financial 
infrastructure was critical to the plan. A gaming website that cannot securely take 
deposits from players or transfer winnings is failing in its primary product. This 
partnership between the provincial government, MCPEI, and CMT was 
supposed to be a Plan B to deal with the uncertainty of an interprovincial 
agreement. In the end, the partnership would not long outlast Plan A. 
                                                                                                                                         
101 OLG sells Lotto Max and Lotto 6/49 tickets on the same website as their online casino games: see 
PlayOLG <https://www.playolg.ca/content/olg/en/lottery.html>. 
102 Earth Future, supra note 75. 
103 Robyn Doolittle & Jane Taber, “Small island, big bet: How PEI lost its online gambling gamble” Globe and 
Mail (27 February 2015), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/small-island-big-bet-
how-pei-lost-its-online-gambling-gamble/article23237214/>. 
104 Teresa Wright, “Unpaid loan to Mi’kmaq Confederacy for E-gaming raises questions”, The Guardian (1 














Four years later, the province pulled out of their partnerships with MCPEI 
and with CMT. They decided that an interprovincial agreement on e-gaming was 
“unrealistic”, and the MCPEI plan was “too legally thorny to proceed.”105 Among 
the investors for CMT were government officials, including some officials 
involved in the project. CMT was later investigated by the PEI securities 
commission, and negative rumours whipped through the province, prompting 
many investors to pull out. PEI’s brief and unsuccessful foray into online 
gambling ended in political disaster, with taxpayers left on the hook for the 
$950,000 spent on the e-gaming report, and with no financial or gaming hub to 
show for it.  
On its face, it seems like the idea of avoiding criminal liability by operating 
out of a First Nations reserve should have taken far less than four years to be 
dismissed as “legally thorny”, but the provincial government and MCPEI were 
drawing inspiration from the pre-existing success of the Mohawk Territory of 
Kahnawake, an Indian reserve located just south of Montreal. Kahnawake has a 
strong tradition of independence and autonomy. They employ their own police 
force of ‘Peacekeepers’, and as part of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (also 
known as the Iroquois League of Nations), issue their own passports and 
identification documents to their members. Kahnawake is governed by a band 
council, recognized and regulated under the Indian Act.106 In the late 1990s, the 
band council devised a plan to both promote economic development on their 
territory, and to protect their community from gaming activity that took place 
there.107 In allowing (and regulating) gambling, Kahnawake claims an exemption 
from the criminal gambling prohibitions based on their inherent right to self-
government, and a more specific Aboriginal right that stems from the centrality 
of gaming and wagers to Mohawk culture. 
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106 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. 
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Many First Nations in Canada and the United States have entered into 
agreements with provincial and state authorities to gain access to gambling 
revenues and to regulate gambling on their territories. Kahnawake took a 
different approach, forming its own gambling regulator – the Kahnawake 
Gaming Commission (KGC) – which is unconnected to the Quebec 
government’s licensing body. The KGC was created by the Kahnawake Gaming 
Law108, a by-law passed by the band council. In addition to traditional land-based 
gaming, the KGC licenses two types of interactive gambling activity. The first 
license type is an “interactive gaming license” or IGL. This license allows the 
holder to develop and maintain infrastructure which is used by service providers 
to host gaming content. To date, the only holder of an IGL is Mohawk Internet 
Technologies (MIT) – a band-owned corporation that remits its profits to the 
Mohawk Council of Kahnawake. The service providers must secure a “client 
provider authorization” from the gaming commission (a “CPA” – the second 
type of gambling license) and can then contract with MIT to host their content 
online. As of 2008, 65 different license-holders were operating 470 websites 
regulated by the KGC.109 This amounted to more than 60% of internet gaming 
traffic across the entire globe.110 Kahnawake bills itself as a globally-recognized 
regulator of online gaming and has a substantial foothold in the online gaming 
industry.   
The licensing scheme under the Kahnawake Gaming Law was challenged in 
court in Horne v Kahnawake Gaming Commission.111 Horne applied to the KGC for 
an IGL license but was denied. Section 28 of the Kahnawake Gaming Law allows 
the KGC to deny applications “on purely policy grounds” even when the other 
criteria for licensing are met.112 The applicant challenged the validity of section 
28 and claimed that the KGC should have granted him a license. He also asserted 
                                                                                                                                         
108 Kahnawake Mohawk Territory, by-law KRL c G-1, Kahnawake Gaming Law (08 July 1999). 
109 Lisa Wright, “Mohawk territory gambling on a risky business”, Toronto Star (19 April 2008), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/business/2008/04/19/mohawk_territory_gambling_on_a_risky_business.ht
ml>. 
110 “Kahnawake's resident cybercasino giant fined for illegal gaming”, CBC News (29 November 2007), online: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/kahnawake-s-resident-cybercasino-giant-fined-for-illegal-
gaming-1.659636 [“Cybercasino”]. 
111 Horne v Kahnawake Gaming Commission (KGC), 2007 QCCS 4897, [2007] QJ No 12366 [Horne].  













that the KGC was under inappropriate political pressure from the Council to 
deny his application. The KGC argued that they had concerns from the beginning 
about issuing a second IGL in addition to that issued to MIT – a band-owned 
corporation. They had made the decision to deny the license, and only then did 
they seek direction from Council on future IGL applications. The court upheld 
the commission’s decision, finding that “the community’s interest prevailed as 
required by [the gaming commission’s] constituting law.”113 Neither side argued 
that the law was ultra vires the band council, and the Court appeared content to 
decide the case based on the provisions of the statute itself. Though this was not 
a decision in a criminal context, the court recognized the validity of the gaming 
law as a whole. 
The biggest question about the Kahnawake Gaming Law remains unanswered: 
does Kahnawake maintain an Aboriginal right to gamble under section 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982?114 If they do, the criminal laws relating to gambling 
would not apply to the Kahnawake Mohawks, significantly changing the nature 
of the conversation around gambling regulation in Canada. Of all the license-
holders under the KGC, only one has ever been prosecuted on gambling charges. 
Cyber World Group – the owner of worldwide cyber-casino GoldenPalace.com 
– pleaded guilty in a Quebec court in 2007. The terms of that guilty plea are not 
publicly available, but it was reported that Cyber World Group paid a $2 million 
fine and relocated their business out of the Montreal area.115 It is also unclear 
which gambling offence Cyber World Group was charged with. Though they had 
offices in Montreal, they were merely leasing servers from Mohawk Internet 
Technologies, so it is unlikely they were charged under section 202 of the Criminal 
Code116 for keeping a gaming device (as they weren’t ‘keeping’ the device 
themselves). At any rate, both Cyber World Group and the Crown prosecutors 
must have felt the uncertainty of their respective positions, agreeing to a hefty 
fine rather than risking jail time or an acquittal. The trial would have been massive, 
requiring not only proof of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, but there also 
                                                                                                                                         
113 Ibid at para 16. 
114 Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act]. 
115 “Cybercasino”, supra note 110. 











22 A SAFE BET Vol. 27 
 
would have been a significant sub-trial about Kahnawake’s right to regulate 
gambling on their territory. If the Kahnawake Gaming Law stems from an 
Aboriginal right, Cyber World Group and other licensees are protected from 
prosecution through the by-law’s authorization. Commentators at the time said 
that this guilty plea raised doubts about the Mohawks’ legal authority for licensing 
gambling,117 but no other prosecutions have occurred since 2007. The question 
therefore remains unanswered, but the Kahnawake Mohawk continue to regulate 
gambling on their territory without interference or protest from the Federal 
government. 
If Kahnawake were to claim in court that they have an Aboriginal right to 
control gambling, the biggest hurdle for them to overcome is the Supreme Court 
of Canada case of R v Pamajewon.118 In applying the framework from Van der 
Peet,119 the court found that gambling was not central to the Anishinaabe of 
Northern Ontario prior to contact with Europeans.120 However, this case is not 
determinative of the Mohawks’ Aboriginal rights claim. Section 35(1)121 claims 
are highly contextual and fact-specific, and there are huge differences in culture 
and history between the Anishinaabe and the Mohawk, which could result in a 
different factual finding. To be designated as an Aboriginal right, it would have 
to be proven that gambling is an “integral part” of the Mohawks’ “distinctive 
culture”.  
 The court in Pamajewon highlighted the ruling of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, which held that “there is no evidence that gambling on the reserve lands 
generally was ever the subject matter of Aboriginal regulation.  Moreover, there 
is no evidence of an historic involvement in anything resembling the high-stake 
gambling in issue in these cases.”122 Among the Iroquois peoples, including the 
Mohawk, there was a strong tradition of high stakes betting, particularly on 
                                                                                                                                         
117 Plus, some concerns that content providers would shy away on a purely pragmatic basis. See e.g. Wright, 
supra note 110. 
118 R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821, [1996] 4 CNLR 164, 109 CCC (3d) 275 [Pamajewon]. 
119 R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der Peet]. 
120 Pamajewon, supra note 119 at para 28. 
121 Constitution Act, supra note 114. 













lacrosse games. One historian recounted how an Iroquois lacrosse spectator 
would stake “almost every valuable article which he possessed” on the outcome 
of a game.123 Betting was not only integral to pre-contact Mohawk culture, but 
was the subject of formalized regulation and governance by the Iroquois. 
Complex rituals and codes of conduct were enforced on the games and the 
betting, and wagers were woven into the structures of governance themselves. 
The use of lacrosse in conflict resolution stems from the Great Law of Peace – 
the constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Great Law of Peace mandates 
that conflicts between nations are resolved non-violently, with each side ‘betting’ 
that they will win.124 It is quite likely that these factors would support the 
Kahnawake’s exercise of sovereignty over gaming regulation on their territory.  
The Kahnawake believe that the KGL falls within their Aboriginal rights. 
Murray Marshall, legal counsel for the KGC and the Mohawk Council of 
Kahnawake, argues that:  
Kahnawake’s jurisdiction to conduct, facilitate and regulate 
gaming and gaming related activities is a facet of the right it has 
as a community of indigenous peoples to regulate and control 
economic development activities that take place within or from 
its territory and, more fundamentally, to govern its own 
affairs.125 
The Mohawk Territory of Kahnawake is taking a proactive approach to 
gaming regulation, but are still coordinating with federal, provincial, and foreign 
authorities when necessary. In fact, the Kahnawake view this type of coordination 
as supportive of their claims to sovereignty. Interwoven in a federal structure, 
Kahnawake is one among several constitutional actors. Murray Marshall describes 
the efforts undertaken by Kahnawake with the goal of “harmonizing the 
legislative provisions of each of the affected jurisdictions”.126 In the wake of the 
                                                                                                                                         
123 Marshall, supra note 107 at 329. 
124 Morden C Lazarus, Edwin D Monzon & Richard B Wodnicki, “The Mohawks of Kahnawake and the Case 
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2007 Cyber World Group prosecution, one member of the Mohawk Council of 
Kahnawake said, of their attitude towards federal and provincial governments: 
“We don’t ask for anything…We tell them that this is our right to do this. And 
we’re doing it properly, we’re administering it properly—the world seems to think 
that we’re doing a good job, and we’re confident we’ll continue to do a good 
job.”127 Regarding the jurisdiction and authority of the KGC, that council 
member said “Kahnawake is well-respected. Its jurisdiction is unquestioned. The 
only place where there is a question is in [our] backyard.”128 Recently, the KGC 
entered into an agreement with the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement 
that any online casinos hosted or regulated by the KGC would refuse to serve US 
customers unless those content providers were properly licensed in the United 
States as well. The Chief of the Kahnawake Territory called the agreement “a 
recognition of [the KGC’s] status as a global online gaming regulator and the 
future opportunities that status could bring.”129  
Whether or not Kahnawake has the authority to do what they are doing, 
there is de facto recognition both in Canada and around the world that even if the 
KGC is not a fully legitimate regulator130, they are an effective one. Hundreds of 
gaming websites are hosted from Kahnawake, and hundreds more are accessible 
from places like Malta, Antigua, and the Isle of Man. While provinces can create 
their own online casinos, Kahnawake has demonstrated that there is significant 
revenue to be made from privatized gambling, and free market access to gambling 
sites is now the norm in Canada.  
                                                                                                                                         
127 “Cybercasino”, supra note 110. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Damon van der Linde, “How a Quebec First Nation gambling commission is playing the long game by 
turning away online U.S. customers” Financial Post (3 October 2016), online: 
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There is evidence that organized crime groups were using servers in 
Kahnawake to host their own gambling content.131 As a gray-market entity with 
limited resources, the KGC is not well-situated to do full background checks on 
all its content providers. The half-measure of delegating responsibility to the 
provinces has not been effective either. Harm reduction efforts funded by 
provincial revenues are undercut by the existence of non-provincial gaming sites. 
Demand reduction depends on gambling revenues to support gambling 
education and information, and these unlicensed sites—even those regulated by 
the KGC—are not required to incorporate provincial messaging on their 
websites. Supply reduction is ineffective when gamblers can easily access 
alternatives online. Reducing provincial gambling revenues is only worth doing if 
the result is a net loss to the gambling sector, not if the profits are funneled to 
private industry. The result of the current prohibitions and exemptions does not 
give governments the tools to effectively compete with the private sector (leaving 
profits on the table) but are still ineffective in curbing problem gambling.  
A national regulatory framework is needed to create online casinos which 
are viable, entertaining, and safe for consumers. Whether that framework 
incorporates the Kahnawake Territory or allows it to continue to operate on its 
own, the federal government must choose either liberalization or prohibition: it 
can’t have both without a unified regulatory regime. Individual provinces have 
not been willing to cooperate on online gaming to any great extent. Apart from 
the Atlantic Lottery Corporation’s online offerings (which are accessible from any 
Atlantic province), each province that hosts online gambling does so on its 
own.132 Each provincial government has different policy goals and different 
gaming infrastructure. Would-be bettors can only access government-sponsored 
online gaming in their own province because of the restrictive wording of section 
                                                                                                                                         
131 Project Colisée, a police operation against Italian traditional organized crime operations in Montreal, 
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207(1)(a).133 The result is a patchwork of content and, more importantly, a 
patchwork of regulatory structures and harm reduction efforts. If it’s worth 
preventing Canadians from accessing gaming services from other provinces, it’s 
worth preventing Canadians from accessing foreign products too. The current 
approach has too many internal conflicts and contradictions to be an effective 
framework for gambling regulation. The 1985 amendments134, while effective in 
increasing gambling revenue, also promoted an expansion in gambling which will 
not be possible to contain. Canadians accept that gambling is a legitimate source 
of entertainment, and that demand for gambling is not likely to subside, even with 
stricter regulations. What is needed is a national regulator like that proposed by 
Dennis Mills in 1996, with the introduction of Bill C-353.135 Provinces can 
provide their input and contribute their significant gaming expertise, while 
Federal regulation will provide a unified and consistent framework across the 
country. This would achieve the best of both worlds: a casino run by the 
government, with revenues returned to the public, and a broad platform reaching 
a huge market for demand reduction and gambling control efforts. All the 
jurisdictional cards are already on the table. The federal government just needs to 
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